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The Desert RATS 2010 Team tested a variety of 
science operations management techniques, applying 
experience gained during the manned Apollo missions 
and the robotic Mars missions.  This test assessed inte-
grated science operations management of human 
planetary exploration using real-time, tactical science 
operations to oversee daily crew science activities, and 
a “night shift” strategic science operations team to 
conduct strategic level assessment of science data and 
daily traverse results.  In addition, an attempt was 
made to collect numerical metric data on the outcome 
of the science operations to assist test evaluation. 
 
The two most important outcomes were 1) the 
production of significant (almost overwhelming) vol-
ume of data produced during daily traverse operations 
with two rovers, advanced imaging systems and well-
trained, scientifically proficient crew-members, and 2) 
the degree to which the tactical team’s interaction with 
the surface crew enhanced science return.  This inter-
action depended on continuous real-time voice and 
data communications, and the quality of science return 
from any human planetary exploration mission will be 
based strongly on the aggregate interaction between a 
well trained surface crew and a dedicated science op-
erations support team using voice and imaging data 
from a planet’s surface. In addition, the scientific in-
sight developed by both the science operations team 
and the crews could not be measurable by simple nu-
merical quantities, and its value will be missed by a 
purely metric-based evaluation of test outcome.  In 
particular, failure to recognize the critical importance 
of this qualitative type interaction may result in mis-
sion architecture choices that will reduce science re-
turn. 
 
There were a number of important lessons that can 
be applied to future human science operations teams in 
support of human planetary exploration: 
 
1) Science operations teams need to be led by senior 
scientists with a range of professional experience 
in geological sciences.  In particular, these teams 
cannot be made up exclusively of junior scientists 
with little operational experience. Leadership is 
critical to providing guidance and varied points of 
view during operations during complex and often 
stressful missions.  
 
2) Continuous communications with stable, high 
fidelity voice and image data gives better science 
return than conditions where communications 
have long intervals between contacts. The scien-
tific interaction between the crew and the science 
operations team that is available during continuous 
communications resulted in a significant im-
provement in the understanding of the science of 
the area explored.  Reduced communications 
would result in a significant decrease in mission 
science return.  
 
3) A diligent science operations team and a well-
trained, scientifically competent astronaut crew 
can mitigate poor communications conditions, par-
ticularly when the communications conditions are 
anticipated and planned for.  This test underscored 
the need for a science operations team that can 
adapt to changing conditions.   
 
4) The volume of data coming out of any given day 
of this mission, particularly when compared to a 
robotic mission, was enormous. As the mission 
progressed, it became difficult for the strategic 
team to assimilate and evaluate the data during a 
nominal shift due to data management problems 
and data presentation techniques.  In particular, 
the time consumed in attempting to evaluate re-
corded verbal data without a written transcript 
made detailed scientific analysis almost impossi-
ble within the given time constraints.  The ability 
to generate written transcripts of verbal observa-
tions will be critical to the science analysis of any 
human exploration mission. 
 
5) When operating with only two daily communica-
tions sessions, science analysis and return 
achieved by a strategic science team was directly 
related to how well the crew provided both the 
contextual descriptions of geology and the image 
data that illustrated the crews’ science descrip-
tions.  In particular, data retrieval problems or 
poor image data collected by the crew resulted, 
not surprisingly, in poor science return.  
 
6) The science metrics collected on Desert RATS 
2010 did not provide unambiguous data on the ef-
ficacy of particular approaches to science opera-
tions management.  Although the data suggested 
some trends, there was not sufficient granularity in 
the data or specificity in the metrics to allow those 
trends to be understood on metric data alone. 
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